```
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 1
                           DISTRICT OF NEVADA
 2
 3
 4
   PETER DELVECCHIA,
                                     Case No. 2:19-cv-01322-KJD-DJA
 5
        Plaintiff,
                                     Las Vegas, Nevada
6
                                     JUNE 7, 2023
        VS.
                                     Courtroom 3A
 7
   FRONTIER AIRLINES, et al.,
                                     MOTION HEARING
        Defendants.
8
                                     CERTIFIED COPY
9
10
11
                       TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
12
13
                BEFORE THE HONORABLE DANIEL J. ALBREGTS
                    UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
14
15
16
17
18
                            Liberty Court Recorder (LCR)
    DIGITALLY RECORDED:
                             3:28 P.M.
19
    RECORDED BY:
20
                             J. RIES
21
    TRANSCRIBED BY:
                             Judy K. Moore, CRR, RMR
22
                             Judy_Moore@nvd.uscourts.gov
23
   Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording; transcript
    produced by machine shorthand and computer-aided transcription.
25
                     UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
```

Judy K. Moore, RMR, CRR

2 **APPEARANCES:** 2 For the Plaintiff: 3 MS. MARGARET A. MCLETCHIE, ESQ. MCLETCHIE LAW 602 South Tenth Street 4 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 5 and 6 MR. JOHN D. MCKAY, ESQ. 7 PARK AVENUE LAW, L.L.C. 201 Spear Street, Suite 1100 San Francisco, California 94105 8 9 For the Defendants: 10 MR. BRIAN MAYE, ESQ. HINSHAW & CULBERTSON, L.L.P. 11 151 North Franklin Street, Suite 2500 Chicago, Illinois 60606 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA; JUNE 7, 2023; 3:28 P.M.

--000--

## PROCEEDINGS

COURTROOM ADMINISTRATOR: Peter DelVecchia versus

Frontier Airlines, 2:19-cv-1322-KJD-DJA. This matter is before
the Court on Docket 215, motion for protective order.

Counsel, make your appearance for the record, please.

MS. MCLETCHIE: Maggie McLetchie for plaintiffs.

MR. MCKAY: John McKay for plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MS. MCLETCHIE: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

MR. MAYE: Brian Maye for defendants.

MR. MICHALEK: Charles Michalek, local counsel for defendants.

THE COURT: All right. Good afternoon. As my courtroom administrator indicates, we are here on Number 215, which is Frontier's motion for protective order. 247 was filed yesterday evening as a supplement to the plaintiffs' opposition to Frontier's motion for protective order. That's a two-page document. It had a few hundred pages of depositions attached, deposition transcripts, attached to that. Additionally, I intend to address Number 248, which is the stipulation regarding the Rule 35 exam and related discovery that was filed yesterday as well. That is gaveled. I intend to grant that,

but I'll address that at the end. Just so the parties know, I will be addressing that today. So when we are finished, I am hoping that we have all of the outstanding discovery issues resolved and that all that is left is the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition and then the Rule 35 examination.

As the parties know, I will give a brief background as to the matters before the Court today, I will discuss the legal standard, and then we will just go through topic by topic. And I will have, on some of the topics, some questions for the parties. On others, I have a pretty good idea of what I'm going to do. But I will give the parties a brief moment on each topic if you want to raise something or address something. And then when we conclude that, we will have -- the transcript will be the order on my decision as it relates to the issues raised in 215.

So let's begin with the background. Frontier moves for a protective order regarding certain of plaintiffs' 30(b)(6) topics. Plaintiff responds that the topics are relevant to its claims. There is a question in terms of the parties' position regarding the meet and confer and whether it was sufficient. I will not address that issue here today. We're just going to go through and address these topics one by one and be done with it.

In reply, Frontier says the topics were overbroad and are thus not relevant to the issues of the litigation.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

5

The legal standard for motions for protective orders generally, as the parties know, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) governing protective orders provides "The Court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, undue burden, or expense." And that's 26(c)(1). "The burden is on the party seeking the order to show good cause by demonstrating harm or prejudice that will result from the discovery." That's a Nevada case, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., vs. Iny, 2014 Westlaw case 1796216. And, again, from May 6, 2014. And Rule 26(c) requires that the moving party make a particularized showing of Rule 26(c)(1)'s enumerated harms. That's a 9th Circuit case, Foltz vs. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company, 331 F.3d 1122, 1138 from 2003. As it relates specifically to Rule 30(b)(6) depositions, once a 30(b)(6) witness satisfies the minimum standard for serving as a designated witness, the scope of the deposition is determined by relevance and proportionality under Rule 26. And I'm going to have to spell this name, P-A-S-I-E-C-Z-N-I-K, Pasiecznik vs. Home Depot USA. That's a Westlaw case from 2022, the District of Nevada, 1652367.

And I would remind the parties, my decision as we go through this today regarding relevance as it relates to discovery, obviously, is not in any way to rule on the admissibility of whatever evidence might be obtained during the

course of this discovery. Of course, admissibility will be for another day and for Judge Dawson at the time of the trial.

So with that background and legal standard, I'm just going to go through the topics as they were outlined one by one. And so the first topic is the specific details of all training given by Frontier to flight attendants Anna Bond, Chelsie Bright (Sakurada) -- I assume that's a married name or something similar to that -- Amanda Nickel, and/or Scott Warren prior to March 28, 2019, on the topics of, A, the circumstances in which Frontier considers physical contact by flight attendants with adult and minor passengers is appropriate; F, circumstances in which Frontier considers it appropriate for a flight attendant to discuss alleged sexual misconduct with a minor passenger and to place a hand on or near the minor passenger's genital area.

Frontier argues that this is argumentative and harassing. It is based on plaintiffs' allegation that Warren asked A.D. whether he knew where Peter's hand was located and that Warren hovered his hand over A.D.'s crotch to demonstrate. Warren denies these allegations.

Plaintiff responds that the allegations about Warren justify their questions about training related to the physical conduct.

I can tell the parties, on this issue, I'm inclined to deny the protective order. I do think that some questioning

on those facts is relevant for discovery purposes. But I will, Mr. Maye -- or Ms. McLetchie -- I'll hear from either one of you if you want to try to sway me either way, but I'm inclined to deny it on this one.

MR. MAYE: Just one comment, Your Honor.

With respect to F, the circumstances in which
Frontier considers it appropriate for a flight attendant to
discuss alleged sexual misconduct with a minor passenger and to
place a hand on or near the minor's genital area, plaintiffs
amended their complaint and they're not alleging that flight
attendant Warren placed his hand on A.D.'s crotch, so we think
that, at the very least, that should be excluded from
consideration.

THE COURT: Well, but the way I read this is it's more about the issue about the training related to the physical contact and so -- or the conduct, and so I would be inclined to allow some questioning on that issue because of that. I understand even though it might not be a direct allegation in the complaint, I think it's relevant to the issues that they raise as it relates to the training.

MS. MCLETCHIE: Just to be clear, the allegations in the Amended Complaint are that the flight attendant Warren placed his hand near A.D.'s groin area, and that's what the topic is on, not on placing it on the groin area, just to be clear.

THE COURT: All right. And, again, I think with that, I will allow -- I will deny the protective order as to that topic and allow questioning as to that. And, again, I will trust that the parties will, you know, have the appropriate questions and limit it to, you know, the issues and not just rephrase question after question on the same topics. But I do want to give you the chance to get into those questions.

Topic Number 2 is the reason why Frontier did not provide a manifest of passengers' names to the crew of Flight 2067 and the availability of such a manifest to members of Frontier's flight operations center during Flight 2067.

Frontier argues that the plaintiffs are seeking this to make the argument that, had the flight attendants checked the manifest, they would have seen that Peter and A.D. shared a last name. Frontier argues that this is irrelevant because the flight attendants were concerned about inappropriate behavior, regardless of family relation.

Plaintiffs counter that this is relevant to whether Frontier exacerbated the situation by not providing its employees the ability to look at plaintiffs' surname.

Again I can tell you, on this one, I'm inclined to deny the protective order. I do think questioning on this will be limited and it is relevant to their theory of the case. But again I'll hear from Frontier if you want to make any further

argument on that, knowing which way I'm leaning.

MR. MAYE: Yes, Your Honor, just briefly. It's not clear to us the reason for Frontier not providing the manifest is relevant to whether it was more likely than not that Warren and Shupe were motivated by racial animus. It appears to us that any Frontier decision about whether to provide a manifest to flight crews was an administrative decision and it has no relevance to the issue of racial discrimination and putting crews in a position where they are going to be more inclined to commit racial discrimination.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. MCLETCHIE: To be clear, Your Honor, Frontier is a defendant on the 1981 claim, Frontier Airlines itself, not just the flight attendants. Further, plaintiffs are seeking punitive damages from Frontier Airlines, and so whether Frontier Airlines -- whether there's a history, a pattern of discrimination, a knowledge of a need to act to prevent discrimination against, in this instance against this mixed race family, is certainly relevant.

It would have been easy, for example -- there's evidence in this case and certainly allegations in this case that the flight crew did not think that the father and son belonged together because they were of different races --

THE COURT: So, Ms. McLetchie, I'm inclined to deny it, and we'll allow you questioning to that as well.

MS. MCLETCHIE: Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Topic 3 was in the briefs, but my understanding is it's no longer an issue and Frontier withdrew its objections. I hope that's the case because I don't have anything on Topic 3.

MR. MAYE: Our only concern, Your Honor, is the last part, "any and all actions taken by Frontier related to the subject matter of those documents, including the reasons for such actions or inactions." We're not clear what that pertains to. If it pertains to questions about pattern and practice, failure to train, fostering an environment which encourages discrimination, then we would object to that.

THE COURT: All right. Then I think that's more appropriately handled with objections at the time of the deposition. And, specifically, if the question is unclear, if it's vague, certainly those objections would be appropriate, but I think as an issue related to the protective order, I don't think that rises to the level of me granting the protective order. So you would be free to object at the time of the deposition, but I think the topics are certainly relevant and appropriate.

MS. MCLETCHIE: And just to be clear, we do think that they should provide a witness prepared to testify even on the portion of this topic that they object to because whether a defendant was aware of anti-discrimination laws and acted in

the fact of this awareness -- for example, we've explained that the Department of Transportation, in January of 2017, I believe, alerted airlines that they should take steps that when they're executing their powers that are in furtherance of safety and security that they do so -- that they be careful to check themselves to be sure that they're not acting in bias, in the exact way that we allege they've acted in this case. And so Frontier's response and actions in response to the DOT -- in response to the DOT alert is certainly relevant to the 1981 claim, in particular the punitive damages.

THE COURT: All right. And I've ruled that you're allowed to question on that, so...

MS. MCLETCHIE: Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. The next topic -- and I think you'll find a theme here as we go forward now with some of these topics -- is not as simple. That's Frontier's policy against discrimination toward passengers. And I can tell you that the concern I have is the following language: "Including the number of times between March 28, 2014, and March 28, 2019, that any employees were subjected to any such consequences as a result of a finding that the employees have failed to follow the policy. In addition, the facts and circumstances that led to any such consequences."

Frontier argues that the Court's already ruled that unrelated complaints against Frontier are irrelevant.

Plaintiffs argue that the Court overlooked plaintiffs' allegations that Frontier acts with reckless indifference to the constitutionally-protected rights of all of its passengers of mixed races, color, and different ethnicities by turning a blind eye to acts of discrimination by its employees and refusing to train or discipline its employees concerning acts of discrimination.

I can tell you that I am inclined to grant the protective order as it relates to the *other findings* and *other acts*. I know that the plaintiff disagrees with some of my prior rulings as it relates to the discovery and some of the other acts and other investigations and not allowing that in, but I think this fits with those prior rulings that I have found that that should be limited and not allowed to be looked into during discovery.

But, Ms. McLetchie, I will hear from you on that one, given that I'm inclined to grant that portion of the protective order of that topic, and that is the March 28, 2014, to March 28, 2019, other investigations. So go ahead.

MS. MCLETCHIE: Thank you, Your Honor. And, obviously, I'm new to this case, but I've studied the orders, and my view is the previous orders were addressing prior motions to compel and a prior motion for sanctions, and the Court didn't hold that prior complaints were irrelevant; the Court limited the number of -- the number of complaints -- the

Court limited it to the last five years, I believe, and to domestic flights and allowed defendant to produce those in redacted fashion. The Court has limited that information because it wasn't proportional, not because it wasn't relevant. And, frankly, the Court's limitation with regard to the request for production, in some of the orders, there's language that plaintiffs can seek the information through the other means. Well, here we are. We're seeking the information through other means.

And I want to point out that some of the Court's prior -- that some of the Court's prior reliance, I think it's worth explaining that the *Karrani* case on these issues is different. In the *Karrani* case, the question was whether the flight attendant had engaged in prior discrimination. It wasn't a question of whether the corporate defendant should be held liable under 1981 and whether the corporate defendant had a history of reckless indifference to civil rights. And here, that is what this case is alleging with regard to Frontier. So the information isn't just relevant with regard to the specific defendants, but we also have the issue where these complaints don't list specific defendants' names.

The database, it's my understanding that information is no longer available. My understanding is we were allowed to do another interrogatory but that -- the interrogatory response was, "The complaints don't list the other defendants." That

doesn't mean the other -- that the individual defendants weren't involved, Your Honor; it means that the database doesn't show their names. And so certainly asking information about these other claims is certainly relevant, in fact, could be the only way that plaintiff gets access to this information.

Notably, the reliance -- the defendants' continued reliance on the *Karrani* case is a little bit perplexing because, in that case, it was a summary judgment case and the plaintiff had had access, I think, to ten years of complaints without the restriction with regard to the names of the complainants and without regard to domestic versus international flights. So we're in a very different procedural posture. The Court determined, I think largely -- largely at least initially, because of the third-party rights of the named complainants, that that information should be limited, but it has not specifically been before this Court whether we could access -- we can ask information about complaints over the last five years at a 30(b)(6) deposition, and it's my view we should be able to more so because of the Court's prior rulings.

This case, obviously, defendants disagree and refute the allegations. Much of their motion to compel is focused on the idea that, well, we deny this and defendant Warren says he didn't do that. That's not the question today. The question is, what are the allegations, and we have allegations of very serious racial discrimination and that Frontier Airlines is

responsible, that there are -- and we -- in discovery, we have obtained complaints, albeit in redacted form, that show there were two and a half complaints per week by passengers feeling that they had suffered some form of racial discrimination.

That is significant. We also have deposition testimony from flight attendants showing that they did not get training avoiding these issues. These questions --

THE COURT: So let me ask you, how do records of -"any employees were subject to consequences as a result of a
finding that the employees had failed to follow the policy."
So how are the consequences of other employees on other flights
that they may have faced if failing to follow discrimination
policies, how are the consequences and the things that they
suffered from other unrelated investigations, how is that
relevant here again?

MS. MCLETCHIE: Because whether Frontier Airlines takes racial discrimination claims seriously is relevant to whether it effectuated appropriate policies and training and whether it should be liable for reprehensible conduct under the punitive damages case law.

THE COURT: So they're not taking action against these employees after there are findings that show a pattern and practice of Frontier just ignoring these things and --

MS. MCLETCHIE: Correct. And what we've unearthed in discovery is that Frontier Airlines essentially has -- never

does a real investigation. We have not been able -- they take these complaints, but they don't -- from what we have been able to unearth in discovery, they don't have a meaningful process to investigate whether there is any validity to these claims and Frontier Airlines does not take steps to avoid and prevent discrimination.

THE COURT: All right. So, you know, I did limit them in the -- you know, in the other requests, in the prior hearings on discovery, and said that there were other ways that they could obtain information. You know, I mean, I -- so I don't know -- I mean, I did rule that unrelated complaints were irrelevant, but I also ruled that they would be able to get into some of those issues through other discovery mechanisms. I guess the question is, what would be wrong at a deposition with your witness to just delve into this? I mean...

MR. MAYE: Your Honor, that ruling was before there was extensive discovery on these prior incidents and before Your Honor ruled that these were unrelated to the subject incident. That ruling was, of course, before Judge Dawson's rulings, and this case -- excuse me -- this issue has been thoroughly litigated by the parties. And with respect to Frontier, Judge Dawson ruled that "The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that plaintiffs have not sufficiently stated that the Frontier decision-makers were responsible for the outcome on this particular flight. The Court finds it would be

more reasonable for plaintiffs to inquire about previous incidents of alleged racial discrimination by defendants Warren and Shupe because they were the ones directly involved. There's not enough of a basis alleging that it was Frontier as a corporation that fostered an environment of racial animus or that Frontier's practices or policies were a but for cause of the injury."

Judge Dawson made clear that this case is not a pattern and practice case against Frontier. With respect to prior incidents and using pattern and practice, the Court has ruled that that may be relevant to the issue of the state of mind of the actors involved, Shupe and Warren, but Shupe and Warren were not involved in any of these prior incidents, so there is absolutely no connection between the prior incidents and this incident. And this has been resolved by Judge Dawson's ruling on the objections to the motions to compel, the fourth and fifth motions to compel.

THE COURT: And I guess, Ms. McLetchie, tell me again why it's different now than when my prior ruling precluded this and Judge Dawson upheld it.

MS. MCLETCHIE: So with all due respect to my same co-counsel, the prior orders were based on the showing in those motions to compel, and I don't think and my co-counsel doesn't think that we made it clear enough that we wanted this information not just with regard to the state of mind of

specific human individual defendants but also with regard to the 1981 claim against Frontier and the punitive damages against Frontier.

Further, we have since also discovered that it's unclear from the records which defendants were involved in which incidents and whether anybody has ever been disciplined. During depositions, that question came up, if anybody's ever been disciplined for treating a passenger on a Frontier Airlines flight in a racially discriminatory manner, and during depositions, we were told over and over, "you'd have to ask HR." That's what you do during a 30(b)(6) deposition, you ask the company.

So this -- I don't think the record was clear about why we were seeking the information. We're not just seeking it because of the -- to figure out if the individual defendants had ever been charged with racial discrimination by passengers.

And, by the way, I also think that there was some confusion because the fact that it's not in their employee file doesn't mean that there weren't complaints against them. It only actually could reflect that there were complaints against them and Frontier Airlines chose not to take action, which would actually be evidence of Frontier Airlines' responsibility and culpability under the punitive damages reckless indifference standard. Both other complaints and against other flight attendants and other flight staff, as well as against

these specific defendants, are ripe fodder for discovery and they're very appropriate for a 30(b)(6) deposition, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You know, in the context of the bigger picture of Frontier's liability, you know, I don't specifically remember the arguments we made at the last hearing, you know, I didn't specifically go back and look at that transcript, but it seems to me that when we talk about it in the context of Frontier's potential liability and the way they handle these and that being some sort of -- you know, creating this atmosphere or, you know, where the discrimination is allowed to go on, it starts having, at least in my mind, some relevance.

What's your response to that, especially when we're talking now in a limited 30(b)(6) deposition where it's not going to be, you know, your client having to get, you know, thousands of records, go through, you know, hundreds of thousands of pages of stuff to look for this stuff? It's something I would assume they could prepare fairly easily on.

MR. MAYE: Your Honor, this issue has been explicitly rejected by Your Honor and --

THE COURT: Did I reject it -- remind me, did I reject it in the context of Frontier's potential liability and how they handled these issues?

MR. MAYE: That's correct. And Your Honor and Judge
Dawson ruled that, to the extent pattern and practice could
potentially be relevant, it would be limited to plaintiffs

establishing a connection between the subject incident and the prior incident. And because plaintiffs have not established a connection, then those prior incidents are irrelevant and not proportional to the needs of the case.

THE COURT: All right. I'm going to hold my decision on Topic 4 for now. I intend to decide before we leave today, but I may take a quick break on that one. I want to go to Topic 5.

MS. MCLETCHIE: Your Honor, may I just read from the Karrani case, a snipit from that case that I know the Court relied on previously?

THE COURT: Not now. I may want you to give that to me when I go back, but I want to --

MS. MCLETCHIE: Okay.

THE COURT: All right. Topic 5 is the contents of Frontier's flight attendants manual and training materials that mention any of the following subjects: H, the prohibitions of flight attendants all congregating in one area of the aircraft during flight or allowing all flight attendants to become focused on a single issue during flight; and, I, the prohibition against more than one flight attendant being in the cockpit at the same time.

Frontier argues that the plaintiffs are trying to show that Frontier's flight attendants were negligent by violating these policies on the date in question but plaintiffs

have not alleged negligence and discrimination can only be intentional.

Plaintiffs respond that this is relevant to show that the employees were not following protocol and were violating other protocols in their zeal to have plaintiffs turned over to the police.

I can tell you, Counsel, Mr. Maye, that I'm inclined on this one -- I do think it's relevant for they weren't following protocols or violating other protocols in their zeal to, you know, have them turned over to the police. I'm not saying I believe those facts, but I think it's relevant that they be allowed to ask those questions. So they're not saying it's to show negligence; they're saying it's to show that they were not following protocols and violating other protocols as a result of their zeal as it relates to this issue, and I think that's probably relevant to their theory as a whole, but I'm all ears if you want to convince me otherwise.

MR. MAYE: Our only comment would be, Your Honor, that whether they were congregating in the cockpit doesn't make it more likely than not that Warren and Shupe were motivated by racial animus.

THE COURT: But I think if they're violating policies, an argument can be made that they violate policies when it suits them and they don't -- you know, they follow them when it suits them. So, I mean, I can see the relevance of

that, even if it's for impeachment grounds, and so I -- I'm going to deny the protective order as it relates to that as well.

And so you'll be able to ask questions about that as well.

Topic 6 is the text of the Relationships With Customers subsection of the Competition and Fair Dealing section of Frontier's Code of Ethics contained within its employee handbook produced in this action and the number of times between March 28, 2014, and March 28, 2019, that any employees were subjected to any such consequences as a result of a finding that the employees have failed to follow the Relationships With Customers subsection, in addition, the facts and circumstances that led to any consequences.

Frontier again argues that the Court already ruled on unrelated complaints and that they are irrelevant.

Plaintiffs argue that this is relevant to Frontier's corporate condemnation of discrimination.

Ms. McLetchie, I presume the arguments in this topic are similar to the arguments in Topic 4, meaning that the Court misconstrued, or whatever happened at the last hearing, the Court didn't understand the relevance argument and it again goes to the Frontier pattern and practice of not addressing things and creating this culture of allowing discrimination to happen and the things and that's why it's relevant?

MS. MCLETCHIE: That's correct. And it's also relevant in a similar way to the congregating in the cockpit and the other areas of the plane is relevant, because we've alleged that Warren inappropriately misidentified himself as Kevin, which is a violation of policy, and that they generally mistreated and treated our clients differently because of race.

THE COURT: Right. So I think on this one as well -- and we're going to have one more -- I'm likely to just take these three under advisement for a few minutes and then come back and rule on those.

But anything that you want to say on that?

MR. MAYE: Really quickly, your Honor, I apologize, going back to Topic 5, the last sentence in H, "Allowing all flight attendants to become focused on a single issue during flight," we believe that's very argumentative and it's not clear what that means. You know, flight attendants are not trained to only focus on one issue, and I don't know how that's relevant to the case, and I don't think there's any evidence that the flight attendants were focused on one issue during the flight.

THE COURT: Well, again, I think they're -- I'm going to allow them to inquire into that.

MR. MAYE: Okay.

THE COURT: All right. Topic 6 I will take under consideration, like I have with Topic 4, and it's likely going

to be the same with Topic 8, but we'll get there after we do Topic 7, which is why no investigation or disciplinary action against defendant Scott Warren resulted from Peter DelVecchia's 2019 complaints -- or complaint to Frontier that Warren had falsely identified himself as Kevin, struck Peter DelVecchia on the head, and physically took his child away from him during the flight.

The defense, Frontier, argues this is argumentative and harassing and Warren denies the allegations that he identified himself as Kevin.

Plaintiffs argue that this is relevant to their allegations, regardless of whether or not Warren denies them.

Again, I think for discovery purposes this is relevant even if Warren denies it, and they can inquire as to why there was no investigation or disciplinary action. And I think a 30(b)(6) witness can answer that. But I will, before I finalize that ruling, hear from counsel.

MR. MAYE: Just quickly, your Honor, our position is that there was an investigation. So we're not opposed to their asking about what investigation was conducted and what was the result of that investigation, but to include a topic of why there wasn't an investigation, why Mr. Warren wasn't disciplined --

THE COURT: So they asked why wasn't there an investigation, and your witness says, there was an

investigation and here's what the investigation was and here's what the investigation led to and here's what discipline or no discipline was done. That should be no more than ten minutes, I would think, so I'm going to deny the protective order as it relates to that.

8 again is similar to 6 and to 4 in the sense that it talks about the years of 2014 to 2019, but let me read into the record what Topic 8 is. "The text of the Compliance With Laws and Regulations section of Frontier's Code of Ethics contained within its employee handbook produced in this action and the number of times between March 28, 2014, and March 28, 2019, that any employees were subjected to any such consequences as a result of a finding that the employees had failed to follow the compliance with the Laws and Regulations section in circumstances where the laws and regulations involved were those that apply to discrimination against passengers on the basis of race or ethnicity. In addition, the facts and circumstances that led to any such consequences."

Again Frontier argues the compliance with Laws and Regulations section of their Code of Ethics is irrelevant and not proportional and that the Court has already ruled that the unrelated complaints against Frontier are irrelevant.

Plaintiffs argue that this is relevant to their allegations that Frontier does not enforce its policies of requiring employees to comply with applicable laws and

regulations.

Again, Ms. McLetchie, is this the same substance of argument as it relates to Topic 6 and Topic 4, that is, the Court's misapprehension of the reason you needed those?

MS. MCLETCHIE: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So I will take that one under advisement as well. And I think those are the only three that have similar issues.

So let's then go to 10. Instances between March 28, 2014, and March 28, 2019, in which any employee or agent of Frontier is alleged to have used the terms -- and it's the proverbial N word -- quote, you people and your, quote -- I'm sorry -- and/or, quote, your kind, end quote, in communications with or about any non-White passenger of Frontier and the details of Frontier's investigations of such occurrences and of any discipline imposed on the employment -- on the employees or agents.

Frontier argues that this is argumentative and harassing and the Court has already ruled that unrelated complaints against Frontier are irrelevant.

Plaintiff argues that although there are no allegations that the employees at issue here used this language, this is relevant to Frontier's indifference toward the civil rights of passengers of color.

 ${\tt Ms.}$   ${\tt McLetchie},$  I can tell you I'm inclined to grant

this protective order request because there's no allegations this language was used in this case, and I'm not sure that other instances of the language being used are relevant. And I guess I understand your argument is that, if there are occurrences and Frontier doesn't do anything, that shows indifference?

MS. MCLETCHIE: If they don't take steps even when the most egregious type of conduct you can imagine is engaged in by a flight attendant, certainly that is very relevant to our pattern and practice claims and our punitive damages claims against Frontier Airlines. Here, we don't need -- in order to show punitive damages, we don't need to show that there's a history of exactly the same kind of racial discrimination that occurred here. We need to show that Frontier Airlines acted with reckless disregard for passengers' civil rights. And certainly if there are multiple instances in which this occurred and Frontier Airlines did nothing, then certainly that's relevant. If they find this to be offensive and this has never happened, as you said with a prior topic, it can be a very short part of the deposition and they can say, there has never been such a complaint. But if Frontier Airlines even --

THE COURT: But isn't that so different than this -I mean, the allegations in your case are completely different
than that. I mean, at some stage, I mean, is there not a
cutoff for how far you can get into this stuff? I mean, every

remark, everything said, you know, is going to be discoverable because it shows that Frontier, if they're not addressing every single one, is a pattern and practice?

MS. MCLETCHIE: They're not addressing any single one, is what we believe to have occurred, based on our discovery.

THE COURT: So what in discovery do you have that that sort of -- that that sort of language is occurring regularly on Frontier flights and they're just ignoring it?

MS. MCLETCHIE: We have several complaints with that kind of language in discovery. And even though in -- to be clear, there are different actors and there are actors that were employed by Frontier Airlines that are not named defendants, Your Honor. Their conduct, the other people on the flight, the other flight crew, their conduct is relevant to the claims against Frontier Airlines.

And I think defendant Frontier Airlines makes too much of the fact that there are specific types of allegations against the Black flight attendant, defendant Warren, and the fact that he didn't like the fact that this was a -- this was a White man with a Black child, but there are other people that felt uncomfortable with A.D. because of how dark-skinned he was. They assumed he must speak a different language. They assumed -- they made all kinds of assumptions based on race.

And so if Frontier Airlines took these racial

discrimination complaints seriously and engaged in basic training of their employees to not make assumptions based on race and to avoid discriminatory conduct against Black people and against mixed race families, these -- it's our allegation that this type of conduct could be avoided and that punitive damages, if we show this pattern and practice, are appropriate.

Whether a fact-finder thinks it's -- these specific instances are similar enough to warrant punitive damages is for the fact-finder, not -- in my view, the Court doesn't need to say -- doesn't need to say, this is too dissimilar from the specific allegations and just because they didn't use -- you don't allege that the N word was used, other complaints against either the actors at issue in this complaint or other Frontier flight crew are relevant, I just don't think that that's appropriate, Your Honor. And, again, if they don't think this occurred and they think this is argumentative and offensive, it should be a very short portion of the deposition. And they can't show that it's somehow burdensome, harassing, and not proportional if they don't think this occurred.

THE COURT: Well, and they're not saying it's not proportional; they're just saying it's argumentative, harassing, and what else?

MR. MAYE: Your Honor, Judge Dawson has thoroughly rejected this approach. He has rejected the pattern and practice of Frontier. Judge Dawson determined it's

speculative, so Judge Dawson said, no, you can't go down this path; there has to be a connection to this case.

And contrary to counsel's representation, there's been no evidence that the N word was used by any flight attendant in any of the prior complaints. From my recollection, the N word was used once by a passenger against another passenger. So this is way out of bounds. It has no connection to our case.

And, again, this is not pattern and practice. Prior complaints are only relevant, potentially relevant, to show possibly the mindset of the same actor that was involved in the subject incident and the prior incident. There was no evidence that any of the flight attendants here or the pilots were involved in any prior incidents. If we go down this path, it's, again, trial within trial --

THE COURT: All right. I'm going to grant the protective order as it relates to that. I do think we are now starting to get down rabbit holes that are just too tenuous. I understand the argument that it's a pattern and practice, but that doesn't -- that's not a way to encompass everything. So I do think that one gets too far afield, and so I will use my discretion and grant the protective order as it relates to questions related to Topic 10.

Topic 13, Frontier's employee handbook *Standard of Conduct* Section 4, including, without limitation, policies on

physical violence and dishonesty, falsification, and misrepresentation.

Frontier argues this is overbroad and vague, harassing, and argumentative, and the Court has already ruled that unrelated complaints to Frontier are irrelevant.

Plaintiffs argue that this is relevant to the specific portions of the handbook that Warren violated.

I will tell you, on the defense side, that I'm inclined to deny this one. I do think that this has discovery relevance to their theory regarding Warren. You know, whether it's overbroad or vague, I don't think this is the appropriate time for me to use a protective order on that. There are other objections that can be made. And I don't think it's so harassing and argumentative that it's a -- should be protected. And, again, I think this one falls outside of the unrelated complaints and so I think it goes directly to Warren, and because it goes to the plaintiffs' theory regarding Warren, I'm inclined to deny that, but I'll hear from counsel.

MR. MAYE: Well, Your Honor, the allegation is that flight attendant Warren violently struck Mr. DelVecchia twice in the back of the head, but the record reveals that not one person observed that, not the passenger seated right next to Mr. DelVecchia, behind Mr. DelVecchia, across -- well, beyond that, Your Honor...

THE COURT: I mean, that will be for the

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Judy K. Moore, RMR, CRR

trier-of-fact.

MR. MAYE: Okay.

THE COURT: We're talking about what's discoverable and what questions.

MR. MAYE: Okay. With respect to dishonesty, falsification, and misrepresentation, permitting that discovery, you know, suggests that the crew is lying and, you know --

THE COURT: It may suggest it, but it's not a finding of it. They're going to have to lay the foundation, get that evidence in at trial, and Judge Dawson may agree with you at trial that it's not coming in. But for purposes of discovery, I'm inclined to allow it. But --

MR. MAYE: Just a question, Your Honor. Will they be allowed to ask about the content and how it's presented to the subject crew or --

THE COURT: Well, I think they're allowed to ask some questions about the content and how Frontier, you know, conveys that to the employees and what they talk about. I mean, they should be allowed some questions about how that interacts with the training of the employees. That's sort of the reason they would be asking the questions to begin with.

And, again, I'm hoping that the parties -- you know, you're not going to take an hour and a half on that topic during the -- you know? So I'm assuming the parties are going

to be working in good faith to ask the questions and then move on to other topics.

Number 17, why no investigation was conducted or discipline imposed relating to Captain Rex Shupe's and First Officer Mullin's failure to follow written procedures for a Threat Level 2 on Flight 2067, including, without limitation, failing to lock down the cockpit, failing to notify air traffic control, failing to consider diversion to a different airport, and failing to prepare for interception by Department of Defense fighters.

Frontier argues this is irrelevant because whether Frontier followed the Threat Level 2 procedures has nothing to do with whether it intentionally discriminated against plaintiffs. They argue that this is aimed at establishing negligence which plaintiffs have not alleged.

Plaintiffs argue this is relevant to their assertion that Frontier condones violations of written procedures.

Again I'm inclined to deny this one because I think plaintiff has created enough relevance within the theory and context of their allegations to make this discoverable. But, again, I'm inclined to hear from counsel as it relates to this topic.

MR. MAYE: Again, Your Honor, our position is, whether or not Captain Shupe asked for fighter jets to escort the aircraft doesn't have any bearing on his mindset and

whether or not he was motivated by racial animus.

Also, a point, Your Honor, Captain Shupe did not know the races of the plaintiffs, so our position is it is not possible for any of this material and this content to be relevant to the issue of plaintiffs' 1981 claim against Captain Shupe.

THE COURT: Well, and so maybe a quick answer to it, the reason there wasn't an investigation, is because we're not going to get the Department of Defense jets out to escort a jet under these circumstances, but, again, I think it is something that they should be allowed to inquire into with this witness, and so I'll deny the protective order as to that and allow the inquiry into that topic.

Topic 18, why no investigation was conducted or discipline imposed relating to Captain Rex Shupe's and First Officer Mullin's failure to follow written procedures on Flight 2067 requiring that no more than one flight attendant be permitted in the cockpit at any one time.

Frontier argues this is irrelevant because whether the Captain and First Officer fail to follow written procedures on this issue has nothing to do with whether Frontier intentionally discriminated against plaintiffs. This is aimed at establishing negligence, again, which plaintiff has not alleged.

Plaintiff argues that this is relevant to their

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Judy K. Moore, RMR, CRR

assertion that Frontier condones violations of written procedures.

You know, again, to quote Bob Dylan, you don't have to be a weatherman to see which way the wind blows. And this, again, I understand your arguments, but I'm inclined to allow them to get into this, again, because it does fit into their theory that employees didn't follow procedures and that's why it led to this whole incident in the first place. So I think they're allowed some limited inquiry, but I'll let you make a further record if you like.

All right. I'll deny the protective order as it relates to Topic 18 and, again, allow questioning as it relates to that.

Topic 27, plaintiff reserves the right to inquire into the content of any and all documents produced as of the date of the deposition by Frontier. Without limiting the foregoing, plaintiffs intend to inquire into the content of all documents referenced in the list of topics of this notice, as well as those listed in Exhibit A. And Exhibit A references the unrelated discrimination complaints against Frontier.

Frontier argues that this is unbounded and overbroad and, to the extent it references unrelated passenger complaints, the Court has already found that these are irrelevant.

Plaintiffs argue that the defendants are routinely

asked questions about documents that they produced in discovery. Plaintiffs are willing to provide a list of questions ahead of the deposition so that Frontier can designate a witness with knowledge about the documents that plaintiff will address.

So, Ms. McLetchie, I'm inclined to deny this. If you provide a list of those questions, and as long as those questions are not irrelevant and are proportional, I'm inclined to allow it. Are you proposing that you provide a list of those questions to Frontier?

MS. MCLETCHIE: We would be happy to provide a list of those questions to Frontier in advance of the deposition, Your Honor.

THE COURT: My only concern is that will we be back here in three weeks with an objection to the list of those questions and...

MS. MCLETCHIE: We hope not. And we will certainly engage in meaningful meet and confer efforts.

THE COURT: Well, so -- and I would say this: I would hope, by the time we're done here today, you'll have an idea of what the Court's position is on what you're allowed and not allowed to do. And once I make a ruling here in a few minutes on whether I allow the other complaints or not, if I decide that we don't, then, obviously, this would be limited by those complaints. And so to the extent I say, you don't get to

go into those things and I'm granting the protective order, that would limit this, but you would still be allowed to ask the other questions.

MS. MCLETCHIE: Understood.

THE COURT: Okay? Understood, Counsel?

MR. MAYE: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. And, again, I'll get back to those other here in a minute. We're getting there.

Topic 30, the details of investigations conducted by Frontier concerning the human trafficking incidence reports -- I'm sorry -- concerning the human trafficking incident reports produced by Frontier to plaintiffs up to the date of the deposition.

Frontier argues that the Court has already ruled that the unrelated reports of trafficking are irrelevant.

Plaintiffs argue that they're relevant to Frontier condoning accusations of human trafficking without follow-up.

It seems to me this topic is similar to the other issues, that is, unrelated investigations. Ms. McLetchie, is that -- am I reading that correctly?

MS. MCLETCHIE: I would agree, but I would also point out that certainly the facts and circumstances regarding other human -- other instances in which Frontier believed that there might be human trafficking certainly can show that this case was different and that there is -- I want to be clear.

There were flight attendants in this case that thought that there was something -- there's evidence that the flight attendants in this case thought something was awry and that they were concerned about what was going on here because of the different races and they thought there might be sex trafficking. Certainly looking at other cases in which there were potential complaints about sex trafficking to see if there's a pattern and practice of other mixed race families -- I know that there's a big news report about a similar incident with a Black 21-year-old girl and a five-year-old -- a five-year-old African-American child that was similar to this case. Certainly that's relevant to the punitive damages against Frontier.

But also, if the other facts concerning sex trafficking were very, very different from this case, it also goes to show that there was racial -- there was racial animus and discrimination here, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Counsel?

MR. MAYE: Your Honor, I thought I heard counsel say that there's evidence that the flight attendants were concerned because of the different races of the plaintiffs. I could have misheard her, but there is absolutely no evidence whatsoever that that was the case. This topic is just like the other topics in which Your Honor and Judge Dawson ruled that prior incidents have no connection to this case, and to rule that

they can ask a 30(b)(6) about the prior incidents would completely unravel Judge Dawson's ruling that the prior incidents are not relevant, they're not proportional. And our position is, this is the law of the case and 30(b)(6) witnesses cannot be asked about the prior incidents about Frontier training, investigations, why people aren't disciplined because of, you know, the allegations of the prior incidents. This has all been litigated and resolved. That's our position, and we hope Your Honor agrees with us.

THE COURT: Okay. So this, then, does -- and I hear what Ms. McLetchie is saying, that it's the human trafficking component and it may make this a little different than the other ones, but generally, it's the same because it has to do with other investigations. And so I'm going to hold off on that because I think it fits into the other three. So now we have a fourth.

And as I look at Topic 31, we may have a fifth because that is the details of disciplinary actions against any Frontier employee and/or additional training provided to any Frontier employees relating to the subject matter of human trafficking incident reports produced by Frontier to plaintiff up to the date of the deposition.

Frontier again argues that the Court's already ruled on the unrelated reports and that they are irrelevant.

Plaintiffs argue it's relevant to Frontier condoning

accusations of human trafficking without follow-up.

Again, Ms. McLetchie, I think this falls into the same category, certainly, as 30. It has to do with human trafficking and the other incidents. I assume you have the same arguments why it's relevant and I should allow that?

MS. MCLETCHIE: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And, defense, I assume it's the same as well?

MR. MAYE: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So I will take 31 as well under advisement here and come back in a few minutes.

And I think 32 fits into that as well. Am I reading that correctly?

MR. MAYE: That's -- you're right. You're right, Your Honor. I think 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38... I think they're all --

THE COURT: Well, I may have some questions on those, so let's go one by one.

So 32, you agree, Ms. McLetchie, given the Court's ruling and taking under advisement other topics that seem to be similar to these issues that this is similar enough, because it relates to the unrelated investigations?

MS. MCLETCHIE: Yes. Sorry.

THE COURT: And it looks like 34 is -- 33 and 34 are as well. So I'm just trying to -- you know, if we get through

these and I'm going to be taking these under advisement, I want to just get them all together so that I can do that, we can take care of the rest. Because I don't have questions on 34 either, and that appears to be other complaints.

MS. MCLETCHIE: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. So 35, though, let me...

Right. So let me -- 35, I do have a question, so let me read that into the record and go with that. So Topic 35 is the details of any instructions that any person in Frontier's management has given to any person assigned to Frontier's customer relations department, regardless of whether the recipient was in a managerial position or not managerial position and including, without limit, any of the customer relation employees working on the Denver team of customer relations and about how the recipient or the employees working under the recipient should respond to complaints alleging racial discrimination, ethnic discrimination, or other forms of discrimination and/or about how such person should code, classify, or index complaints that contain allegations of discrimination.

Again, Frontier argues that the Court's already ruled on the unrelated complaints and that they are irrelevant.

Plaintiffs argue they're relevant to the details of the special panel that Frontier has established in its corporate office to receive and bury complaints of

discrimination.

And so my question would be, are there allegations that Frontier's management improperly responded, coded, or classified complaints related to this incident, or are you seeking a lot of other incidents? And if that's the case, then it probably falls under this category of topics that talk about other investigations that are the big issue here today.

MS. MCLETCHIE: Both, Your Honor. And I do want to point out, both regard -- with regard to 35 and 36, I think they both highlight why snowballing a prior discovery order on prior specific discovery of unredacted passenger complaints, I think that's exactly -- I think this shows exactly why that's problematic.

Here, for example, we discovered that there's this team in Denver that handles all complaints about racial discrimination and that, essentially -- we want to ask more questions about things that we have been able to discover. Certainly the Court did not say any of this information -- none of this information was irrelevant. The Court allowed us to get some complaints. The Court allowed us to do discovery on issues regarding complaints of this -- in this case and other complaints.

In the process of doing that discovery, which usually happens before a 30(b)(6) deposition, we want to know, what are these templates that were -- for example, in Number

36, not to skip ahead, but that were testified to? We want to understand more about the evidence that we have gathered so far.

But I also want to be clear, Your Honor, and that's usually how discovery goes, you get information through written discovery and through witness depositions and then you do the 30(b)(6) deposition, but I also want to be clear. I've heard a couple of times that we don't have evidence, we haven't proven or established. We don't need evidence to get evidence. We have allegations. But we certainly have started to gather evidence and information through the process of discovery that then leads to appropriate 30(b)(6) topics, which I think many of these are appropriate 30(b)(6) topics. And I'm assuming that we'll have some general discussion at the end about whether this -- the Document 232, the last order on all of the prior discovery, whether it precludes us from ever getting other, for lack of a better word, pattern and practice or complaint information, and I don't think it does, Your Honor.

MR. MAYE: Your Honor, again, this was addressed by Judge Dawson, and there's a limit. Your Honor ruled that the prior incidents were -- or you and Judge Dawson determined that the prior ruling, I think Docket 83, allowing for the production of prior incidents, was collaterally relevant, and since we produced thousands of pages of these -- pertaining to these occurrences, Your Honor and Judge Dawson determined that

plaintiffs have not established a connection between the prior incidents and the subject case; therefore, no further discovery is permitted.

Judge Dawson said that, "the information plaintiffs seek to compel lacks the substantive connection to their individual case." Their assertion that the connection is that the evidence will show a pattern and practice is speculative. Therefore, Judge Dawson ruled, no more discovery on this stuff. It's established -- or they have failed to establish a connection; therefore, this stuff is not relevant, not proportional.

THE COURT: All right. So I think 36 -- I do think 37 falls under this category, and so I'm going to -- I don't need to hear any other argument on 37 either. I think that fits into the category of taking that under advisement. And I'm going to take 35 and 36 under advisement because -- well, and I'll rule on those in a minute. So that leaves us with 38 and 39.

All right. So Topic 38, details of the destruction in May of 2020 of the database that contained crew member assignments for past flights or the rendering of that database as no longer searchable.

Again Frontier argues this is unrelated complaints and they are irrelevant for the reasons that they've outlined at length here today.

Plaintiffs seek the details of the spoliation -Frontier's spoliation of a critical database that would
identify the flight attendants and pilots who were working on
the flights on which the 338 discrimination complaints arose.

So, again, Ms. McLetchie, why -- on this one, why wouldn't -- what is it about this request that doesn't -- or that is different than the other ones talking about other complaints?

MS. MCLETCHIE: This is different because they -essentially Frontier is making the circular argument that there
was no bad action taken by even any of the crew members that
were involved in this case because it's not in their employee
files. But that's not the real question. The question in this
case is whether there were complaints against them and Frontier
failed to take action such that -- or failed to even adequately
investigate such that it would be in their files. And
certainly I think we should be able to probe further into the
facts surrounding the destruction of the database. It
certainly would have allowed us to tie information regarding
complaints to the specific crew members in this case, and so
information about their failure to preserve this database in
the middle of -- and its destruction in the middle of this case
I certainly think is relevant.

Even besides the pattern and practice, it's relevant to whether the actual crew members, the named and unnamed crew

members, the ones that are named defendants and the ones that aren't, whether they were personally involved in other complaints. We can't -- we cannot prove that because of the destruction of this database.

THE COURT: What about their personnel files?

MS. MCLETCHIE: This is -- this is the circular issue, Your Honor. They say, "Look, they must not have been involved. It wasn't in their personnel file." If they didn't take action against them or they didn't even investigate, if instead -- and this is why we want to get at information concerning how these complaints are investigated, right, whether -- if Frontier never takes action and never even puts it in someone's personnel file, that is certainly also relevant to our claims against Frontier for punitive damages.

So certainly information regarding the destruction of this database is, I think, really central to our claims, and it's not just about other complaints regarding other crew members.

THE COURT: Well, so that, to me, might be the crux is, are you wanting to ask questions about what was in the database about other complaints, or do you want to ask questions about, how could you possibly have destroyed this database and would there have been information in the database that wouldn't have been included in the personnel file?

MS. MCLETCHIE: All of the things that you just

said, Your Honor, I think are appropriate for a 30(b)(6), and we would be happy to clarify this question further, but I think, in light of the issues in this case, I certainly think those questions are all relevant questions for a 30(b)(6) deposition.

THE COURT: So I would be inclined to allow you to ask questions about the destruction, about what's contained in the database, what's in it versus what's in the employment files. I think the difference is, I need to decide whether I'm going to let you get into the other complaints based upon the arguments you made here today, and if I'm not, then I would limit on this topic questions to those areas and not allow you to get into questions of other complaints. If I decide to allow that, then I would probably deny it as a whole on this one. Does that make sense, Ms. McLetchie?

MS. MCLETCHIE: Yes.

THE COURT: Because I do think, even if I say that you're not allowed to get in -- if I stick with the decision that counsel says we've already made in the case and I'm not going to let you get into all the other examples despite your arguments today, I still would be inclined to let you get into some issues about how it was destroyed, why it was destroyed, what would be in there that wouldn't be in the personnel files. That, I think, would be relevant. And so to the extent that that's the questions, I'm going to grant that right now.

To the extent that you want to get into the other complaints and things that might have been destroyed, I'm going to take that under advisement here and come back out and rule on that.

MS. MCLETCHIE: When you say "other complaints," just so we're clear when we're thinking through and preparing for this deposition, Your Honor, do you mean other complaints not against any crew members involved in this case?

THE COURT: I just -- I mean the other complaints that you guys wanted to delve into to show the pattern and practice unrelated to this and the parties involved in this case.

MS. MCLETCHIE: Other than the parties or the crew members involved in this case?

THE COURT: The crew members, yes.

MS. MCLETCHIE: Okay. So other crew members -- crew members not involved in this case? So when you say "other complaints," that's what you mean?

THE COURT: Yes. I mean other unrelated complaints, other crew members, because the crux of my initial ruling in precluding you all from doing that was it was just going too far down the proverbial rabbit hole of, where's it going to lead, it's too onerous on, you know, the defense, and so that was the crux of that ruling. So as it relates to this topic, I would be inclined to let you ask questions about this database

and what was in it vis-a-vis the employment file of an individual and what might -- you know, are there other things, just to delve into that, but limit you -- if I decide you're not going to get into the other unrelated complaints, that you wouldn't be able to get in and ask, what other unrelated complaints would be in that database?

MS. MCLETCHIE: Understood.

THE COURT: Having said that, Counsel?

MR. MAYE: Your Honor, again, Your Honor and Judge Dawson already ruled on this, that there can't be spoliation when the information being sought is not relevant or proportional.

Also, this information was never even asked during discovery. They're asking for Frontier to find the crew assignments for every one of those flights that were related to a prior unrelated incident. And they want that information because they want to interview the crew members to ask about the prior incidents and --

THE COURT: But I'm already saying I wouldn't let her get into that. I think she'd be limited -- unless I change my -- you know, unless I reconsider the ruling and allow them to get into some of these things based upon what they've discovered in evidence and her arguments today, unless I change that ruling, she wouldn't be allowed to get into that. It would just be specifically, how did it get destroyed, what are

the details of it being destroyed, what was in there, what was in there that might not have been included in employment files?

MR. MAYE: They're two different systems. They have received everything regarding the personnel files of the crew members involved. This other database, it wasn't destroyed. It wasn't destroyed.

THE COURT: Well, again, can't the witness, then, sort of answer or flush out what happened or whether it was destroyed or not destroyed? Again, without getting into other complaints, if I limit that -- and, again, I'm not sure which way I'm going to go, but I'll have a decision here in a few minutes. If I limit that, then she'll be precluded -- or they'll be precluded from getting into that, but they would be at least able to ask limited questions about, what is this database, was it destroyed, what happened, were there things in the database that weren't in the employee files? And that would be essentially the extent of just getting into what happened with this database, because I think that would be discoverable.

And like I said, if I rule that they're not going to be able to ask about other complaints, then she won't get to ask about what other complaints are in that database. She'll be precluded from all of that. All right?

MR. MAYE: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Last but not least, Topic

39, a witness to authenticate as business records of Frontier all the documents listed on Exhibit 8 to Plaintiffs' Fourth Request for Admissions to Defendant Frontier Airlines; or if Frontier disputes that portions are retained as its business records, to authenticate the portions of such documents that are its business records.

Frontier argues this seeks irrelevant information and the Court already ruled that plaintiffs' request that Frontier admit that over 2,000 pages of documents were authentic business records was neither relevant nor proportional.

Plaintiffs respond that authenticating these at the deposition would be laborious but far less laborious than having a custodian witness at trial.

So I assume, then, Ms. McLetchie, these are unrelated complaints that you want authenticated; is that right?

MS. MCLETCHIE: It's a number of records that they've produced. We've asked them to admit the authenticity, and I think the issue here is that they're -- that Frontier is conflating their view about what's relevant and proportional with a reasonable request to authenticate business records that have been produced in this case that the Court has found to be relevant and proportional to the needs of the case.

We're not talking about getting -- this is not --

this has nothing to do with the debates we're having today about whether we're entitled to additional information; it's about whether the limited information that the Court allowed us to get we can even try to get authenticated, right? And so, in my view, this is information that we were permitted to get that, for whatever reason, Frontier's refusing to be reasonable and authenticate and that we want to be able to address authentication at the 30(b)(6) deposition.

THE COURT: And, again, lay out for me why. Is it also a trial thing, to just get rid of a step?

MS. MCLETCHIE: Yeah. And we want to -- and also for motions for summary judgment. We want to address -- we want to address the authenticity of these records. And it would be very efficient.

I don't think Frontier is really, really saying that they're not authentic records. They produced them. They should just be reasonable on this, to the authenticity. They're not, and so we need to be able to deal with this at the 30(b)(6).

MR. MAYE: Again, this has already been addressed by the Court. Most of the documents are the unrelated complaints. Certainly, if the case goes to trial, we will be, you know, stipulating to the authenticity of relevant documents.

They've --

THE COURT: Are there other documents -- so I get,

given the Court's rulings, and unless I overturn that, you know, when I go back in chambers and come back out and make my final ruling, I get that your position is, if it's unrelated complaints, they shouldn't be authenticated and you shouldn't be required to do that, but to the extent there's other discovery, other business records and things that are not, are these things that you're going to object to authenticating them?

MR. MAYE: No, Your Honor. They've lumped together 2,000 pages of documents that -- you know, authenticate these, this batch of documents. If they want us to stipulate to the authenticity of portions of the flight attendant manual, of course we're going to do that. This is all about prior incidents. That's what it was. 2,000 pages, admit these are all authentic, you know, that these were created in the course of business, we can't do that.

THE COURT: All right. So, Ms. McLetchie, to the -is the vast majority of this *other complaints*, or is it other
documents that are just business records?

MS. MCLETCHIE: It's both. But I want to be clear. The Court has never said prior complaints are not discoverable in this case. The Court -- and then this Court limited them to more narrowly than the District Court judge did eventually, but we were allowed to get complaints over the last five years regarding racial discrimination. So certainly -- certainly the

Court said further information, getting them in unredacted form, isn't relevant -- or isn't proportional to the needs of the case, but the Court has never said, those records are not potentially discoverable or relevant.

I don't want to -- I think this is the issue: We're trying to take a discovery order on a limited discovery dispute based on the showing that was before the Court and then try to shoehorn the rest of the case and say that these -- the Court's already decided that none of these complaints are relevant. We don't have to make an evidentiary showing, but the Court didn't even have the complaints, obviously, before it when it addressed the prior questions, but it did allow us discovery on prior complaints. And so I think that Frontier is taking an absurd limiting read of this Court's prior orders.

MR. MAYE: Well, I think the prior orders speak for themselves, and Your Honor and Judge Dawson ruled that they were produced because they were collaterally relevant. Once produced, it became clear that the substance of these complaints are completely unrelated to this incident and they're not relevant, not proportional, so I would disagree that the interpretation is absurd.

And with respect to authenticity, of course we will agree to stipulate to the authenticity of our documents produced during discovery that relate to our policies, our procedures, but these -- the vast majority of these documents

are related to the prior incidents, including statements submitted by other people not created by us.

THE COURT: Is there a way that you can split out the things that you can authenticate that don't fit into these other complaints and --

MR. MAYE: Absolutely.

THE COURT: -- other things like you just described, whatever --

MR. MAYE: Yes, absolutely.

THE COURT: -- that you can authenticate out of these 2,000?

MR. MAYE: Sure. Absolutely, yes.

THE COURT: And what you're saying and what your protective order seeks is a protective order over the other complaints that you, again, have argued continually this afternoon are already the subject of discovery orders, and that's why you don't want to authenticate those?

MR. MAYE: Yes, Your Honor. I think we can do this in a more efficient manner or more productive manner. I don't know why this is an issue --

THE COURT: Is this something that could be stipulated before trial so that you don't have to call witnesses in?

MR. MAYE: Absolutely. Absolutely.

MS. MCLETCHIE: Your Honor, I just want to make

clear, there's never been a ruling by this Court on at least (indiscernible) the case, but it became clear that these other complaints were irrelevant. The Court has never made a ruling on summary judgment. The substance of the other complaints is not -- has not been before the Court. The Court previously addressed whether we could get -- whether we could get the -- whether we could get the plaintiffs' names.

And I also want to point out that these are Frontier documents. Frontier customer representatives take calls. The only way you can make this kind of complaint is by calling in. Frontier customer service representatives populate the complaint, and that's the report that's created. It is not customers writing letters, "Dear Frontier Airlines: This is what happened." These are documents. There's a form. And that was one of the topics that we were discussing earlier. There's a form and a template that Frontier uses to document what the agent -- what the agent summarizes regarding these complaints. These are Frontier documents. These are not things that they're receiving.

MR. MAYE: Your Honor, I think -- I think counsel made a good faith argument there, but she's mistaken. A lot of the documents are documents created by customers. They go onto Frontier's website and they submitted to Frontier, so they're created by the passengers, not created by Frontier. So I think this is something we should be able to work out, but certainly

we object to authenticating prior unrelated complaints submitted by passengers.

THE COURT: All right. So I think I've ruled on everything except -- and correct me if I'm wrong, please -- 4, 6, 8, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, and 39. And now on 38, I've sort of alluded which way I was going depending on what I'm doing with these *other complaint* issues. Is that the parties' understanding of where we're at?

MR. MAYE: I'm sorry, Your Honor, could you go over that again? I apologize.

THE COURT: The ones we have left -- and I will say, the ones we have left, it is essentially this issue of, has what's occurred since the last discovery rulings in the course of discovery and the information that plaintiff has uncovered change the circumstance such that my prior ruling and Judge Dawson's affirmance of that ruling not allowing the plaintiffs to delve into all these other complaints and the like, whether I now allow with these questions of the 30(b)(6) witness the plaintiff to delve into these areas. And so the topics that address that, address the *other complaint* area, are Number 4, Number 6, Number 8, Number 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, and 39.

And, again, as I've indicated, 38, I'm inclined to allow some questions, but if I decide the other complaints are still irrelevant and continue to follow that ruling, then you

would not be allowed to question on Topic 38 as to other complaints but, rather, the destruction of the database.

And then 39, again, the authentication of the records relates to the other complaints, and so I'm going to take that under advisement here and go to chambers to consider these and will come back out in a few minutes and rule on the others.

Am I missing any?

MR. MAYE: No.

MS. MCLETCHIE: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And, Ms. McLetchie, do you have that case available that I could take to chambers to look at it?

MS. MCLETCHIE: Well, it's the case the Court relied on before, and I just want -- what I want to point out about that case --

THE COURT: Just if I don't have to go pull it again --

MS. MCLETCHIE: No. No. It's the *Karrani* case.

And I know the Court relied on it in its prior decisions, and I don't know that the record was clear enough in the prior briefing that we are seeking -- we are -- we did name Frontier as a defendant in the 1981 claim. In *Karrani*, the airline was not the defendant. The question was whether the defendant flight attendant had engaged in racial discrimination. And what happened there is the prior ten -- the plaintiff was able

to obtain a broad amount of discovery, ten years of prior racial discrimination claims, I believe, against that crew -- that crew person.

This is different because we are alleging --

THE COURT: So if it was just against the crew, you should certainly get it here because it's against the whole airline and it fits into your theory that the airline is liable, given their pattern and practice and...

MS. MCLETCHIE: Yes, and it's -- because when -- because we want to show that Frontier -- we should be able to show -- and, in fact, we've been able to discover in discovery that there are two and a half complaints a week for the last five years on just the domestic airlines. We are entitled to be able to prove reckless indifference to civil rights violations.

THE COURT: All right. Briefly, Counsel?

MR. MAYE: Oh, yes, sir. I think Number 27 is also related to prior incidents.

MS. MCLETCHIE: I believe you ruled on 27.

MR. MAYE: Did you grant 27?

MS. MCLETCHIE: He denied 27.

MR. MCKAY: We're going to provide a list of questions.

MS. MCLETCHIE: We're going to provide a list of questions in advance, yeah.

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. MCLETCHIE: We agreed to do that, yeah, so we will do that.

MR. MAYE: So, Your Honor --

THE COURT: And then I said on that one that the list of questions, if I say that unrelated complaints are irrelevant and not proportional and I continue with that ruling, then the questions wouldn't include that on that one.

MR. MAYE: Okay. We have a copy of *Karrani*, and just for clarification, the *Karrani* case, the defendant was JetBlue.

MS. MCLETCHIE: The defendant was JetBlue, but the plaintiffs -- the plaintiff was not seeking information about further complaints against JetBlue. The plaintiff sought and was given further -- there were complaints against the crew member defendant over the span of ten years, and the *Karrani* decision said, despite the broad scope of discovery, you've only been able to get one witness. Those were unredacted complaints. It was a different issue.

THE COURT: All right. This is getting awfully close to counsel sort of discussing the case and not arguing to the Court. I'm going to take a recess here for a few minutes. The parties can remain at ease, and then I'll come back out and rule on the rest of those matters. So I'll be back in a second.

(Recess from 4:45 to 5:12 p.m.)

THE COURT: All right. We are back on the record in Peter DelVecchia, et al., versus Frontier Airlines. I have taken a few minutes and gone back and reviewed some of the prior orders and some of the other issues related to the case, and so let me tell you where I'm going with this and what my thoughts are and what my decision is.

I do think, in reviewing my prior order, or the -- and Judge Dawson's order affirming my order, and in reviewing those, I recall that I specifically had concerns at the time with a couple issues as it related to the other complaints and the identity of the individuals in those complaints. And I know specifically the two big issues that I had at the time as it related to the case law and the issues I had to consider were that, number one, divulging the name or the names of all of those complainants could create all sorts of different issues, not the least of which was privacy issues and those people potentially being contacted. And I had, you know, grave concern, which is why I ruled as I did, that the names would not be provided.

And then, secondly, the Court had grave concerns that, as the rules of evidence contemplate, parol evidence rule and some of the others, that we would end up in multiple mini trials of these other complaints to try to see how they played into this complaint and whether Frontier, you know, lets this

go on -- lets these types of acts go on and then we would just have, you know, multiple mini trials about other incidents.

And so that's why I limited it to five years and the complaints and that's what was provided.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

When I look at that, I do think the defense is overreading or at least giving an overbroad interpretation of those rulings, because as I hear the plaintiff now argue twofold, number one, that with more discovery, they believe that they can prove that Frontier knew about this, condoned this, created an atmosphere to allow this, however you want to talk about it, but whatever the liability that Frontier would have, the discovery the plaintiffs tell me has shown that has helped with these complaints, that they have a culture of allowing this to happen and that flows right into their arguments for Frontier's liability and that they should therefore be allowed to ask the 30(b)(6) witness questions about that, questions about whether there are consequences for employees not following policy and whether employees are subject to consequences that Frontier's doing anything about this. And I recognize that, as Ms. McLetchie argues, that some of my rulings previously, not only specifically directed them to use other discovery techniques to get information, but suggested there were other ways that they could get the information without me granting their requests for names and the scope of discovery that they wanted, and so I limited it.

But I certainly think at this stage that what they've discovered in the course of the discovery, or uncovered, what their theory is as it relates to Frontier's involvement in this and just the fact that these are topics that a 30(b)(6) witness would generally be able to answer, I do think they should be allowed to ask questions about what Frontier does with these complaints. I think this is different than getting names and going into all of the, you know, ten or 15-year history, which is why I limited it to five years.

And so as it relates to Topic 4, 6, 8, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, and 38, I will deny the request for a protective order and I will allow the plaintiff to ask questions regarding what Frontier does with these complaints, how they handle them, if employees are disciplined, the issues that they have indicated they are going to be asking. Again, you're not entitled to ask names, you know, to delve into mini trials on each one of these.

I would note specifically that Rule 30(d)(1), when it talks about these depositions or examinations, limits them to one day and seven hours, and so, Ms. McLetchie, you'll have to figure out what topics and what areas you want to get into within the course of this order, but, again, I want to make it clear that the names and specifics of those complaints, you know, again, are off limits, not the specific of the complaints but the names.

And then, really, I think I'll leave it to you,
Ms. McLetchie, and your counsel as to what you guys want to do
with your examinations, but, really, the intent of the Court is
to allow you to get into what Frontier does or doesn't do with
these complaints; whether their procedures, policies, allow
this culture to exist; whether they condone it, you know, those
sort of things so that you can develop your case as you see fit
against Frontier Airlines.

As it relates to 39, I am going to order the defense, to the extent that you can authenticate the records that you're comfortable authenticating, that you do that -- or not do that but allow your witness to do that, or maybe before the deposition you all can get those records together and do that and agree on it. And then I would say that -- ask you guys to meet on the remaining records and see if agreements can be reached; and if not, then we can address the authentication issue once that's been narrowed down at a later time.

But I heard counsel tell me that there were a fair amount of those records that you would agree to authenticate, so I would ask that you all get together, do that, and then what issues remain on the authentication if you can't agree with, then I guess you'll bring them back to the Court and we'll address that issue at that time. But I think it's probably easier to -- you know, to the extent you guys can address that and to the extent you want to use your seven hours

on authenticating documents, I'll leave that to you as well.

But, again, I think that can be done in other means during the course of the case before trial.

But I -- so I will grant the protective order to the extent I will not ask the defendants to authenticate all of the documents. I will simply ask you to go and review the documents that you can authenticate in good faith and not have a problem with. The ones that you object to, we can address it at another time. And I will grant the protective order as it relates to the ones that you object to, and we can address that if you want to raise the issue, Ms. McLetchie, later on, arguing that you should be able to have access or get those authenticated.

All right. I think that addresses everything, but I think when I went back to chambers I left the stipulation back there. So before I get to the stipulation, let's talk about 215. Is there anything else that you want to raise as it relates to 215?

MR. MAYE: Well, Your Honor, I do want just a little more clarity on what can be asked because --

THE COURT: Well, I'm denying the protective order. The prior discovery orders still are relevant to the case and so, I mean, they're not going to be able to say, give us the names of the people.

So, for instance, on 8, they want to ask the number

of times between March 28, 2014, and March 28, 2019, any employees subjected to consequences as a result of -- I mean, so they can ask that. What consequences? Was there discipline?

MR. MAYE: In your order, Document 192, you ruled that more evidence regarding the unrelated complaints and Frontier's handling of the complaints in general... I'm sorry. "As discussed more fully above, *Karrani* and *Acton* are persuasive, and based on those cases, the Court does not find more evidence regarding unrelated complaints and Frontier's handling of the complaints to be relevant to plaintiffs' case," so it appears that your ruling contradicts that, and it's --

THE COURT: Well, what page is that on of the 14 --

MR. MAYE: That's Page 12 of Document 192.

THE COURT: What line is this?

MS. MCLETCHIE: Your Honor, if I may, I think the issue is taking that out of context. As the Court already pointed out, the more evidence that we were trying to get in that information was the contact information of the third-party passenger complainants. We wanted to interview them and get information and get their side of the story.

The further -- the Court wasn't generally issuing a protective order against all evidence regarding these complaints; it was addressing the more evidence that was at issue in those motions to compel.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: And, I mean, I'm reading that, and that's what it's talking -- that was my concern. So to ask -so I'm just saying, your reading of my order is far more expansive than I intended it to be at that stage, because now we're at a 30(b)(6) who's going to be asking your representative about what was done with these complaints, as opposed to getting into interviews of -- I mean, because that was my concern, as Ms. McLetchie pointed out, the fact that they would go out and contact these people who don't want to be contacted, reinterview these people that don't want to be reinterviewed, open up all these little mini trials of all these other little things, and that, to me, was just overbroad and not proportional. But now when they're simply asking a 30(b)(6), you know, When you get this complaint and you had this, what do you guys do? Are you doing anything? Are you not doing anything, that doesn't get to that point. And so that's why I think it's an overbroad reading.

MR. MAYE: But there's already been a ruling by Your Honor and Judge Dawson that these prior complaints are not connected to the subject incident and --

THE COURT: Yes, but to the extent how Frontier handled them and the context of their complaints against Frontier and what's come up in the discovery since then, I think limited questioning of a 30(b)(6) witness in a seven-hour deposition isn't disproportional or overbroad.

Now, as it relates to -- and I don't have the number in front of me. Do you all have the number on the stipulation of the other examination?

MR. MICHALEK: 248, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So as it relates to 248 -thank you -- I will grant that stipulation as it relates to the
scope of that examination. Now, is there anything else I need
to address on that? It looks like the parties have agreed to
it.

MR. MICHALEK: We have, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Counsel?

MR. MAYE: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MAYE: A couple of things, Your Honor. There were, like, 320 prior complaints. Only 160 related to Frontier Airlines. 100 and, I think, if my math is right, 170-something were related to third-party vendors, not Frontier. So now we just have 160, and these 160, the Court already ruled that the substance of the complaints, there's no connection to the subject incident.

And also, the Court ruled that pattern and practice cannot be pursued for discreet discrimination claims. Their pattern and practice can be pursued for class actions, which is not what we have here. And Your Honor also ruled that the *Karrani* Court's analysis is persuasive here and that evidence

of past complaints by others is only relevant in limited circumstances where a plaintiff can make a showing to connect them to his claims. This is not one of those limited circumstances. And that was -- that ruling was made in the context of plaintiffs' claims against Frontier.

The Court determined that the only relevance of these prior complaints would be to potentially prove the state of mind of the actors involved in this incident and it couldn't be used to show pattern and practice with respect to Frontier. The concern is, we have 160 complaints against Frontier, which is very, very, very miniscule, 160 complaints over a five-year period with, I think it was 5 million passengers, so the percentage was, you know, less than -- it was, like, point 0000. So we're not sure how a 30(b)(6) can take questions about 160 complaints about disciplinary actions taken against flight attendants when there's no evidence that these claims have merit. So we still have to do a trial within a trial. We're talking -- you know, we're talking about a passenger who is upset that they were charged a baggage fee and they're claiming speculatively that --

THE COURT: You know, if she wants to spend her time, seven hours, on that, isn't that good for you? If she wants to talk about complaints like...

MR. MAYE: Well, I just think that this rule has -- this issue has been resolved already.

THE COURT: And that's -- and you've argued that a number of times today, and that's what your argument was for almost all of the objections, all of the requests for protective order. So I understand that --

MS. MCLETCHIE: And just to be clear for the record, the Court has not reviewed all of these complaints and determined that they are not relevant or -- the Court hasn't made a summary judgment order in this case.

THE COURT: We don't need to make any more records. I've already ruled. I know one side, as always, disagrees and doesn't like the ruling, and I understand that, but I've made my decision, and you all can take whatever action you think is appropriate.

And, again, I would just encourage, when this deposition comes around, that, you know, you keep it relevant, keep it pertinent. Don't re-ask the questions. You know all that. It just makes me feel better to tell you that.

MS. MCLETCHIE: Of course.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else from the plaintiffs, Ms. McLetchie, Counsel?

MS. MCLETCHIE: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. From the defense?

MR. MAYE: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. Court is in recess. Enjoy the rest of your evening.

(Proceedings concluded at 5:30 p.m.) --000--I, Judy K. Moore, a court-appointed transcriber, certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript transcribed from the official electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter. Date: June 22, 2023 /s/ Judy K. Moore\_ Judy K. Moore, CRR, RMR Official Court Reporter United States District Court District of Nevada